Abstract: This research, based on a pilot study performed by the Israeli Electricity Company (IEC) 
INTRODUCTION
Energy conservation and energy efficiency are almost universally accepted desiderates of modern, sustainable societies. A culture of energy conservation makes people obtain important savings, on one side, and helps fighting against global warming, pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, as well as various other threats of our ecosystems, on another side. Reducing electricity consumption is part of the energy conservation endeavour, and household consumers are among targets. The demand for energy and the difficulties encountered by energy providers worldwide in supplying consumers' demand for electricity are, however, increasing. These increases are due to rapid population growth and rising standards of living (Benders et al., 2006) , electricity being linked to both living standards and cultural dimensions in complex ways (Brager & de Dear, 2003) . Adding in the equation the dramatic changes produced by the air-conditioning technologies, the explosion of smart devices and the continuous price reduction of electrical products, it is no surprise that both researchers and governmental specialists have drawn attention to the importance of better managing the electricity demand, to save a country's energy resources and to prevent the collapse of electricity systems as a result of the electricity companies' inability to meet increasing electricity peak demands habits (Tabori, 2012) . In this light, experiences from all countries and from particular economic, geographic and cultural contexts around the world are important, considering that previous studies have shown important differences in attitudes about comfort (Brager & de Dear, 2003) or materialistic values (Ger & Belk, 1996) . Israel would be a perfect case from this point of view -high economic development, moderate attitude towards materialism, high degree of population education, specific geographic conditions indicating high expected levels of energy use in both seasons (winter for heating, summer for air-conditioning).
The home consumption sector (household consumers) in Israel, which up to 2012 was not included in demand shifting programs, received the government's "recognition" as a sector whose inclusion in demand shifting programs could significantly improve demand shifting in peak hours (Ronen 2102a ). Furthermore, this sector is an important target in the government's policy for decreasing electricity demand (Abrahamse et al., 2005) . Among other things, this situation has resulted in recognition of the need to erect a smart electricity grid in Israel. A smart electricity grid is based on technology upgrading of the existing electricity network and is realized by combining advanced information and communication systems, with the aim of achieving an efficient, trustworthy, economic, and safe network that would grant Israel energy security (Yahav, 2012 ; Israeli Smart Energy Association, 2013). In order to decrease the gap between electricity supply and demand, the smart electricity grid network uses an approach called Demand Side Management (DSM). This approach involves various devices aimed to improve both the electricity system on the consumer side and consumers' energy consumption behavior. Among the means exercised are the use of more efficient insulation materials and electrical products that are more energy efficient, pricing methods that include monetary incentives for engaging in certain consumption behaviors, and sophisticated real-time control of decentralized electricity resources that leads to consumers behavioral changes. In the DSM approach, an accepted means of encouraging household consumers to reduce their electricity consumption is through exercising economic incentives of various kinds, such as programs based on dynamic pricing, in which the consumer reacts to a tariff that changes according to demand hours clusters, i.e., the tariff is higher in peak demand hours and lower in low demand hours (Fan & Hyndman, 2011) . In order to supply demand during peak hours, all power stations are operated and all fuel mixes used, including the most polluting ones. Programs exist, based on positive monetary incentives, such as giving consumers a bill discount for reducing electricity consumption during peak hours (Mizobuchi & Takeuchi, 2012) and negative monetary incentives, such as applying fines for consumers who exceed the electricity consumption quota determined by a block rate arrangement framework. An additional program allows consumers to participate in a demand management arrangement according to which the consumer receives a monetary incentive from the electricity supplier for closing electrical appliances in the home during peak hours (Demand Response (DR)). Previous studies (Faruqui & Sergici, 2013; Derby, 2010) have shown that a higherlevel awareness of financial aspects influences consumer behavior and encourages a decrease in electricity demand, in particular when the additional information allows a clearer image of electricity use. From the consumers' viewpoint, electricity is almost "invisible" and their involvement in the field of the demand for electricity is low (Watson et al., 2002) .
Various approaches were suggested in order to reduce electricity demand, based on rational-economic, social, or psychological behavioral factors (Elbaz & Zait, 2017) . The present research is part of a more complex one, which investigates, in several stages, consumers' perceptions, stated and actual behavior towards the most important approaches and mechanisms used worldwide. We focused on the economic approach, examining the influence of a monetary incentive on consumer behavior and the electricity demand patterns of household consumers in Israel. Its goal was to examine whether a monthly monetary incentive at a constant level causes household consumers to decrease their electricity demand and/or shift it away from peak hours. Furthermore, it examined the influence of the monetary incentive on consumers' readiness to join a demand management arrangement in the future.
The research was based on a pilot study performed in Israel, in which the Israeli Electricity Company (IEC) examined the application of a smart board that allows "load shedding" -automatic remote cutting off of electrical appliances in the household, during peak load hours. The results of this study -the first one that addressed the household consumers' economic point of view towards instituting a smart grid for demand management in Israel, could help build better electricity systems, that consider the needs and constraints of the electricity network on the one hand, and the needs and expectations of the consumers, on the other.
RESEARCH CONTEXT

Electricity Demand in Israel
The electricity production capacity in the Israeli economy is 17,360 MW, of which the IEC produces about 13,600 MW, which comprises approximately 78% of electricity production capacity (Public Utilities Authority, 2015). The IEC is a governmental public company responsible for supplying most of the electricity consumed in the Israeli market, according to a license granted by the power of the electricity market law (Israel Electric Corporation, 2016). The rest of the electricity, approximately 22%, is supplied by private electricity suppliers, who account for about 4,000 MW, that is, approximately 23.5% of the total production capacity. A further 051 MW is produced using renewable energies produced by photo voltage (PV) technology, a technology for generating electricity from solar energy, constituting approximately 4.5% of the total electricity produced in Israel.
The electricity produced in Israel has to meet the demand of about 2.65 million customers, of whom about 2.4 are household consumers, whose average demand for electricity in Israel in 2015 was approximately 6,600 kwh a year (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). These household consumers have contributed to the rise that has occurred in the total annual demand for electricity in Israel. During the last 20 years, the electricity demand in Israel has grown at an average annual rate of approximately 4%. The electricity demand forecast predicts that the total demand for electricity in Israel will double in two decades (Mor et al., 2008) and will grow at an annual average rate of 3.5-3.8%. In the last decade alone (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) , the electricity demand grew by about 30% and the electricity demand during peak hours by approximately 40% (Herzog & BDO, 2016) . Moreover, the electricity demand growth rate in Israel is high as compared to the OECD average and is derived from characteristics unique to the Israeli market, which are as follows:
1. The natural population growth in Israel is the highest among the OECD countries, approximately 2% per annum. This figure is three times higher than that of OECD countries, the demographic growth of which is 0.6% on average (OECD, 2016). The reasons for this high rate of population growth are the high fertility rates, positive immigration of Jews from all over the world, and a rising average life expectancy. 2. Economic growth and rising average income per capita causes a rising standard of living expressed in purchasing many electric appliances and/or those having high energy consumption. These factors increase the demand for electricity (Benders et al., 2006) . As a result, the current monthly expenditure on electricity is increasing. Fuchs and Lorek ( 2115 ) found that an increase of 1% in income can lead to an increase of up to 4% in energy consumption. 3. Climate change influences electricity consumption, especially in situations of extreme temperature that cause fluctuations in electricity demand peaks during cold and hot periods (Golan-Angelko & Brauer, 2008), mostly because of the growing demand for refrigeration in summer (airconditioning) and heating during winter (electric heating) (Israel Climate Change Information Center, 2011).
Characteristics of Household Consumers' Electricity Demand
A unique characteristic of electricity is that it is an "invisible product," which the consumer cannot perceive by regular cognitive means. As opposed to physical products, the consumption of which can be seen, electricity is simply a product that reaches the home and makes appliances operate (Watson et al., 2002; Darby, 2006) . In this sense, it also differs from other energy products, such as car fuel. Even if the consumer cannot see these products, he/she can perceive them and their cost in simple terms, such as price per liter and number of kilometers per liter. In general, for most consumers the demand for electricity is a field in which their involvement is low (Watson et al., 2002) . Electricity consumption is mostly spontaneous and uncalculated, or not governed actively by a specific person or body. At this point, it should be mentioned that in situations where there is no competition, for example in Israel, probably the consumer involvement is even lower, as the consumer conceives electricity as a basic product, the consumption of which cannot be significantly reduced and for which there are few substitutes (Tabori, 2012) . In fact, the common conception is that the level of household consumer electricity demand is rigid, that is, a price change will not significantly change the amount of electricity demanded, and consumers feel that they cannot influence the electricity bill or its price in any way. In general, it is obvious that many consumers are not aware of their electricity consumption level or the change that modifying their electricity demand behavior could bring about in the amount of their consumption (Darby, 2006) . Consumers tend to consume electricity without any forethought, by habit and expecting to receive electricity services automatically when performing routine actions, such as turning on a light, air conditioner, or heating appliance. In fact, consumers view electricity as a simple consumption product and expect it to be supplied the instant they activate the switch (SGCC, 2011).
Influence of an Economic Incentive (Positive/Negative) on the Household
Consumer's Demand for Electricity -a literature review
Studies conducted in recent years indicated that an economic incentive or compensation has a positive influence on the consumer's decisions, expressed in a decrease in the household consumer's demand for electricity (Petersen et al., 2007; Mizobuchi & Takeuchi, 2012) . Nevertheless there are studies (such as Geller, 2002 and Abrahamse et al., 2005) indicating that economic compensation has only a short-term influence, and the positive effect disappears the moment it is no longer given. A model that was found to influence consumers' behavior in the framework of a demand management arrangement is giving a discount in the electricity bill to a consumer who has reduced electricity consumption during peak hours. This model requires that a "baseline period" be determined against which the reduction can be measured. For example, in an electricity saving program in California (the 20/20 Rebate Program) household consumers were offered a 20% discount in the electricity bill if they reduced their electricity consumption by 20% during the summer months as compared to the same period in the previous year (Goldman et al., 2002) . The results of a survey on the subject show that about a third of the household consumers decreased their consumption in at least one of the summer months. Nevertheless, the survey's successful results should be considered with certain caution, because, in addition to the economic incentive of a discount in the electricity bill, the electricity saving program was accompanied by a campaign (an explanatory program) that elevated the consumers' cognition of the issue; that is, the success of the program was derived not only from the economic incentive but also from improving the consumers' cognition of the issue of possible economic saving embedded in the program.
Israel instituted a program based on the California 20/20 Rebate Program as a consequence of the fear of an "electricity drought" in the summer of 2012, in which about 181,000 households (approximately 600,000 people) participated. These consumers reduced their electricity usage by approximately 10% in June and 8.5% in July, a saving in monetary terms totaling 286,000 dollar. Furthermore, in addition to the actual saving of about 6 million kilowatt during the months of June and July, a saving of about 3 million was registered in their electricity bills (Ministry of National Infrastructures, Energy and Water resources, 2012). In a similar field study carried out in Japan (Mizobuchi & Takeuchi, 2012) , household consumers were offered a monetary incentive of 2.5$ for each 1% savings in electricity as compared to the same period in the previous year, which resulted in a 5.9% reduction in household consumers' electricity demand. An additional model that was found to influence electricity demand positively during peak hours was a DR program, a dynamic type of demand management that enables the electricity supplier to directly control (Direct Load Control) consumers' electrical appliances remotely and cut off only non-critical appliances during peak load hours at short notice (Sevradolev and Dolev, 2009; DOE, 2006) . This program entails a contract between the electricity supplier and the household consumers (Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010) participating in it. The consumer usually receives a monetary incentive in the form of a discount in the electricity bill in return for participating in a demand management arrangement, and in return, the electricity supplier commits to performing "load shedding" (an automatic remote cutoff) that complies with conditions agreed with the customer, such as the number of annual "load shedding" events, duration of each "load shedding" event, notification of a "load shedding" event (such as SMS) a short time before it is scheduled, etc. This program requires the use of tools offered by the smart network, such as a smart meter and a smart electricity board. An additional model that may influence consumer behavior in a demand management arrangement involves a monetary fine (punishment) dependent on the electricity demand volume.
Public bodies (for example, government bodies and electricity suppliers) significantly influence consumers' economic behavior (Soman, 2007 ) and therefore they utilize various tools for influencing their economic decisions (Lusardi et al., 2007) . One of these tools is the imposition of various taxes and fines on the consumer, which influence his/her decisions. For example, a mechanism called the Inclining Block Rate tariff, based on a variable electricity price that is dependent on the total electricity quantity that the customer consumed, is applied. This mechanism comprises two or more steps (most mechanisms comprise two steps, but there are also others that comprise three or more steps), where the electricity quota and tariff at each step are different and determined by the electricity supplier's goals and the household consumer's characteristics. At the first step, a basic quantity of electricity is charged at a reduced price, deviation from which takes the consumer to the second step, where a certain quantity of electricity is charged at a higher price. The first tariff is 15% lower than the uniform tariff and the second is 25% higher than the uniform tariff. This mechanism, which includes both a discount when consumers do not exceed their quota and a fine when they do, encourages a behavior change among household consumers that is expressed in a reduction in their electricity demand (Dolev et al., 2012) . The use of a stepped tariff is not new and is applied by many electricity companies worldwide. The use of electricity quotas as a means of decreasing electricity demand was also found to be efficient in an "electricity drought." For example, Tabori (2012) presented a study of the Brazilian government's management of an electricity shortage, during which consumers were given an electricity quota. Consumption in excess of their quota caused them an electricity supply disruption, so that they had to pay higher prices (fines) ranging between 50% and 200% for the excess. Using this mechanism of stepped tariffs in conjunction with other factors, such as a discount in the electricity bill for consumers who saved electricity, led to an electricity consumption decrease of 25% in Brazil. In Israel, the electricity tariff is homogeneous, whereas a stepped tariff is applied in the water market.
Concept of Demand Management -relevant literature
One of the major problems faced by electricity suppliers worldwide and in the Israeli market in particular is the need to provide a regular supply and meet the demand during peak hours or a possible deviation from the electricity capacity. The electricity market in Israel is defined by energy policy makers as an "energy island," as it is required to meet the electricity demand at any given minute and during a peak in electricity demand electricity cannot be bought from neighboring countries, as occurs in Europe and the USA (Tabori, 2012) . The cost to the market of not supplying electricity at these times is variable and, among other factors, depends on the cost of backup systems, economic value, and the cost of damages caused by electricity outages. In general, it can be stated that the economic costs of not supplying electricity are high for the market; for example, the immediate market cost of an electricity outage is estimated at 34.6 dollar per kilowatt (ERCG, 2011), so that one hour of electricity outage costs the market 183 million dollar, of which the household consumers' sector will absorb damage equivalent to approximately 26.5 million dollar. Furthermore, the need to meet electricity demands also in peak periods necessitates the erection of expensive power plants on a limited land resource, plants that are in fact required during only a few hours a year (Sverdlov & Dolev, 2009 ). In Israel there are one hundred yearly critical peak hours (Grossman, Eylon, & Goldrath, 2007) , mostly recorded in the summer season (caused by air conditioners operating in the middle of the day, mainly in public, industrial, and business facilities) and usually due to extreme weather conditions (Golan-Angelko & Brauer, 2008).
As a means of reducing the gap between demand and supply during those hours when the IEC cannot meet the full demand for electricity on one hand, and to decrease the damage caused to the market during a shortage on the other, the management of customers' electricity usage is emphasized. In fact, this approach involves several means used by various large corporations. The concept of managing customers' electricity usage, called Demand Side Management (DSM), is aimed at improving both the electricity system at the consumer side and consumers' energy consumption behavior. Among the means activated are the use of more energy efficient insulation materials and end products (electric appliances), tariffs that include monetary incentives for certain consumption patterns, and smart online control of decentralized electricity resources that lead to a change in customer behavior. In fact, every action performed on the consumption side of the electricity system is included in the definition of the DSM, from replacing old light bulbs with more economic ones to instituting a dynamic system for regulating loads. In the past, this concept was aimed more at the electricity supplier, who was requested to construct various systems to regulate demand. This approach changes, and it looks like in the future it will be aimed more at customer behavior (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011) .
It is important to understand that there is a big difference between electricity consumers: big business consumers have a greater ability to anticipate and manage their activity demands than private consumers, who act more intuitively and individually. Although electricity saving devices, such as insulation and economic electric appliances, are very important, the main area on which DSM focuses is the management of consumer demand through the use of smart electricity networks that enable consumers to make educated decisions concerning their use of electricity through information they receive from the network itself. In addition, electricity suppliers also use the information they collect about decreasing loads during peak demand periods. In fact, the household consumer's educated use of electricity means that they engage in consumption behavior aimed at reducing and avoiding waste of electricity, and shifting loads from peak to low demand hours, thus limiting the demand at peak hours in the national electricity supply system. The importance of this approach was expressed in a plan initiated by the International Energy Agency (IEA), which is a combined effort of 19 western countries for promoting and identifying opportunities for reducing electricity demand during peak hours. The program includes a line of studies aimed at achieving an optimal combination of production sources to meet the changing electricity demand (International Energy Agency, 2011b). Thus, a demand management system contributes to reducing the gap between electricity demand and supply without needing an enlargement of production capability. It can therefore be considered an additional resource ("energy source") similar in scope to a power station, because it is an alternative means of making the necessary energy available rather than increasing the electricity production capacity. The electricity unit (watt) saved as a result of increasing energy efficiency or reducing electricity demand is called a "negative watt" (nega-watt). Stated simply, the cheapest electricity unit is that one which was never produced (Bartram, Rodgers, & Muise, 2010). Sverdlov and Dolev (2009) even noted that, according to the experience accumulated in the USA, the realization of plans for energy efficiency and electricity demand management is cheaper than building power stations providing a similar capacity. Furthermore, these plans contribute to reducing fuel consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and pollution, and can be operated in a short time. For example, Rogers, Messenger, and Bender (2005) showed in their study conducted in California that the cost of saving a kilowatt in the framework of investing in projects for efficiency and demand management is 0.03$, as compared to the 0.06$-0.17$ cost of producing a kilowatt in a conventional power station.
In order to encourage household consumers to perform actions aimed at managing their electricity demand in a way that would influence the shape and level of their electricity demand curve ( Gellings & Chamberlin, 1993; Cheng, 2005) , mainly by shifting or reducing electricity demand from peak hours, various policy tools and other means could be implemented. For example, a price policy could be instituted, compatible with the reasonable consumption of the individual, whereby the consumer receives incentives and favorable tariffs to reduce electricity demand in peak load times. Planned cutoffs (load shedding) of electricity during peak hours, performed by DR, a type of dynamic demand management where the electricity company controls households' electricity remotely and can cutoff noncritical loads during peak hours, can also be applied (Sverdlov & Dolev, 2009 ).
Demand management works at four different levels: (1) reducing maximum demand at peak times, (2) shifting consumption to non-peak hours, thus increasing demand at low load times as a balance for demand reduction at peak times, (3) reducing the consumption rate in general by adopting aware consumer behavior, and (4) consumption planning. All these are done while maintaining a high service level and good comfort level, relying on a combination of using energy efficient electricity appliances and efficient behavior patterns that reduce the average probable demands of consumption (Bonneville, 2006 ).
Smart Grid approach
Despite technological advancement, there have been no significant changes in traditional electricity networks in most electricity markets in the world for several decades. These networks suffer from inefficiency and many mishaps due to old equipment and technology and a (central) hierarchical structure that does not suit the severe requirements of the electricity supply today (Gungor et al., 2011) . Especially demands from stakeholders and various regulatory bodies are problematic, related to such issues as decreasing air and environmental pollution by reducing electricity production during peak hours, shifting to renewable energy sources, and improving energy efficiency, which involves decreasing electricity consumption in general and decreasing peak demands for electricity in particular (Epri, 2011) . Furthermore, the traditional electricity grid is not technologically compatible with the cooperation required for combining sources of decentralized and renewable electricity production, such as wind turbines and PV cells for producing electricity from the sun's rays, which require new production processes (Potter et al., 2009 ). All these factors have led electricity markets in several countries worldwide, mostly the USA, Europe, and Asia, to grant high priority to the development and assimilation of smart advanced grids that would replace the old traditional electricity grid, in a way that constitutes a world technological revolution in the management of the electricity market (Mazza, 2003) . They could considerably change the way electricity consumption is conceived by consumers and influence the manner in which this consumption is managed by decision makers, such as governments, regulators, electricity companies, and consumers (DOE, 2012).
The term "smart grid" can be interpreted variously, but basically the intent is to create a grid based on a combination of the existing electricity network and communication, control, and information systems. The international energy association defines a smart grid as an electricity network that uses advanced digital and other technology for managing and controlling the electricity supply from all production sources to meet changing consumer demand (International Energy Agency, 2011a). The objective of the smart grid is to fit the demand for electricity with the electricity production capacity (Yahav, 2012) , and therefore, in contrast to existing traditional electricity networks, the smart grid is characterized by a twoway flow of electricity, from the electricity utility to consumers, and from consumers, who have turned into producers -their new label being "Prosumers" (Lampropoulos, Vanalme, and Kling, 2010) -and provide electricity to the network from renewable electricity sources, to the electricity utility. For example, some consumers possess photo voltaic (PV) facilities for producing electricity from the sun and can provide information of electricity consumption in real time (Von Dollen, 2009).
After the thorough analysis of these previous studies and the context of the Israel market, a research was performed in order to find out the effects of a monetary incentive experiment on household electricity consumption, described in the next section.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Plan
As mentioned above, this research was based on a pilot study performed by the IEC, in the framework of which a smart board aimed at allowing the use of a DR program for decreasing home consumers' use of electricity during peak hours was utilized. The smart board enables the IEC to directly control home consumers' home appliances (DLC) and remotely disconnect them, automatically and selectively (disconnecting only home appliances with non-critical loads) during hours when the load on the electricity network is high. The pilot study had a duration of 16 months, in which the IEC performed interventions in each consumer's home demand management ("load shedding") according to the consumers' preference for the circuit's essentiality. The pilot study focused on examining demand management during summer and winter, which are characterized by "peak" demands.
One hundred home consumers who agreed to participate in a demand management arrangement received a constant monthly financial incentive of 85 dollar through a discount in the electricity bill for the entire period of the pilot study in return for allowing the "load shedding." Most of these consumers lived in the same neighborhood in an Israeli city, Netanya, and 59 lived in the same building of apartments. All were consumers in the top 3-4 percentiles of electricity consumption. The participants were requested to define the order in which they preferred their home appliances to be disconnected during peak load; for example, the dish washer should be the first and the air conditioner the last appliance to be disconnected. Measurements were taken during three periods: before, during, and after the demand management arrangement. All measurements refer to the hours in which the electricity consumption was at its peak. The electricity value measurement represents the total of the electricity demand in five months: two summer months and three winter months. In the findings section, these measurements are labeled "electricity demand survey." Furthermore, in order to examine the stances on home consumers' electricity demand amongst the arrangements' participants (experimental group) and among participants who did not participate in the arrangements (control group), 36 out of the 100 participants in the arrangement were invited to a meeting where they were asked to fill in a questionnaire. These results are labeled "stances survey" in the findings chapter.
Research Goal
The research focused on the financial aspects of electricity consumption and its goal was to examine whether a constant monthly monetary incentive (with no correspondence with actual consumption) given to household consumers who participated in a DSM with the electricity supplier (IEC) would lead them to decrease their electricity demand and shift it away from the peak hours. Furthermore, the research examined the influence of an economic incentive on the household consumer's willingness to join a demand management arrangement in the future.
Research Questions
The main questions for the research were: 1. How does a monetary incentive managed through a smart board affect the demand for electricity of household consumers during peak hours? 2. How does a monetary incentive managed through a smart board affect the tendency of household consumers to reduce their electricity demand? 3. How does a monetary incentive affect the consumers' willingness to join a future demand management arrangement? 4. What is the effect of a monetary incentive on the consumers' tendency to save electricity relative to other factors, such as other economic incentives, convenience motive, and environmental protection motive?
Research hypotheses
Based on the results of previous studies analyzed in the literature review, several hypotheses were formulated: 2. H1: A monetary incentive managed through a smart board has the effect of reducing household consumers' electricity demand during peak hours. 3. H2: A monetary incentive managed through a smart board affects the tendency of the household consumer to reduce electricity demand. 4. H3: A monetary incentive affects consumers' willingness to join a future demand management arrangement. 5. H4: A monetary incentive has a stronger positive influence on the consumer's tendency to save electricity than other factors.
Research instruments and sample population
In order to check the hypotheses we used data gathered in the internal operational system of the IEC, for the experimental group, as well as data obtained through the questionnaire based survey from part of the experimental group and the control group. The internal data included the figures for electricity consumption during peak hours of 59 electricity consumers who participated in the IEC pilot study. They included three reports about electricity consumption during peak hours in summer and winter, which were produced for three periods: the year before, the year of, and the year after the pilot study. A short and focused questionnaire was designed for examining further research hypotheses. The questionnaire was adapted for the examined population based on scales used in three previous studies . The sample population that filled the questionnaires consisted of 116 subjects, of whom 57 were men and 59 women, aged 25-73 years. Of the subjects who participated in this research study, 36 had participated in the IEC pilot study, which dealt with the demand management arrangement, and 80 had not participated (control group).
MAIN FINDINGS
Electricity Demand Survey
In order to examine the first hypothesis, we analyzed if there are differences in the average demand for electricity (expressed in KW) for the group of consumers who had participated in the IEC pilot study for managing the demand for electricity. A one factor variance analysis (ANOVA Repeated Measures) of the three measurement periods was conducted (see Table 1 ). A significant difference was found in consumers' average demand for electricity during the pilot period and in the period after the pilot ended. A significant difference (sig.<0.01) in electricity consumption between periods was found in a comparison of period pairs (LSD Pair wise Comparisons) between the periods before and after the pilot study (MD=-112.73, SE=15.798). A significant difference (sig.<0.01) was also found in electricity consumption between the periods before and after the pilot study (MD=-162.37 SE=17.70). It should be noted that the demand for electricity in fact rose during the pilot study period, in contrast to the expectation. Thus, H1 was not confirmed -electricity consumption did not decrease during the pilot study, the monetary incentive having the opposite effect.
Attitudes Survey 3.2.1 Descriptive statistics
An examination of the data of the research participants who filled the research questionnaire, divided into those for the group that participated in the demand management arrangement and those for the group that did not participate shows that, in general, approximately 50% of the participants were men and 50% women (49.1% and 50.9%, respectively). A comparison of the groups reveals that the representation of men (56.3%) was slightly higher in the arrangement group and that of women (61.1%) was slightly higher in the group without an arrangement, but this is not a significant difference. Most of the participants were married (88.8%), both in the arrangement group and the group without the arrangement. Also, over a third of the arrangement group lived in a household consisting of five people (35.7%) and above three quarters (77.6%) of this group were employees in a full-time job. The picture is similar for the group without an arrangement. It seems that about two thirds of the arrangement group earned between 2,286 and 3,429 or above 3,429 dollar. These figures were repeated for the group that did not participate in the demand management arrangement. From table 2, which shows the distribution of the research continuous variables of the groups that did and did not participate in the experiment, it can be seen that the average age of the participants was approximately 41 years, and their years of education were on average 15.65. It can also be seen that those who participated in the demand management arrangement paid a little more attention to electricity savings than those who did not. Furthermore, it can be seen that among those who participated in the demand management arrangement there is a greater willingness to join a demand management arrangement in the future than among those who did not. From the aspect of the financial incentives for saving electricity, it seems that those who participated in the demand management arrangement attributed more importance to the economic incentive and to being able to buy energy-efficient electric appliances at subsidized prices as incentives for saving electricity. In contrast, there is no significant difference between the two groups in terms of the importance attributed to a fine as a motive for saving electricity.
Inferential Statistics
In order to test the second hypothesis, that there is a difference in the average propensity of consumers who did and did not participate in the demand management arrangement (pilot study) to reduce their electricity demand, a t test was conducted for the two independent samples. Table 3 presents the analysis results. The results of the analysis show no significant differences on average between the two groups of subjects in terms of the demand for electricity. Thus, the second research hypothesis is not confirmed.
To test the third hypothesis, a Spearman's correlation analysis of the relationships between the various types of incentives and the willingness to join a future arrangement among consumers who participated in the demand management arrangement (pilot study) was conducted. The results are shown in Table 4 . The results of the analysis show that there is a statistical significant correlation between the willingness to join a future arrangement and the identification of a monetary fine as a factor that would influence electricity savings (r=0.349; p=0.037). No statistical significant correlation was found between the consumers' willingness to join a future arrangement and the identification of a subsidy of electric appliances or a discount in the electricity bill as factors that would influence their electricity savings. A comparison of the two groups showed that the statistical correlation between the readiness to join a future arrangement and a monetary fine was significant only in the group that participated in the pilot (r=0.349; p=0.037) and was not found significant in the group that did not participate in the pilot (r=0.108; p=0.342). In order to deepen the understanding of the influence of a financial incentive of a discount in the electricity bill on the willingness to participate in a demand management arrangement in the future, a correlation analysis was conducted among all the participants in the sample population (those who had participated in the pilot and those who had not) to examine the relationship between the willingness to participate in an arrangement and a monetary incentive of a discount in the electricity bill, when the arrangement involves an invasion of privacy, loss of control of the use of appliances, and the control of household appliances being given to an external company. The results are shown in Table 5 . According to the analysis results, it seems that there is a significant statistical correlation between a monetary discount in the electricity bill and the willingness to join a demand management arrangement in the future that could negatively affect the consumer's privacy (R=0.233; p<0.05). Nevertheless, in cases where the control of home electricity appliances is lost and the control is turned over to external companies, no significant statistical correlation was found between receiving a monetary discount in the electricity bill and the willingness to join a demand management arrangement in the future. Accordingly, only a partial confirmation of the third research hypothesis H3 is obtained.
To test the fourth hypothesis H4, a regression analysis was performed, to examine the tendency to save electricity as a result of financial incentives, convenience motives, and environmental protection motives among all participants (both those who had participated in the arrangement and those who had not). The results are presented in Table 6 . From the results in Table 6 , it can be deduced that the results of the regression model were significant (p<0.01). An examination of the variables showed that, among the motives that predict an electricity savings, only environmental protection was found to be significantly predictive (β =0.432; p<0.01). That is, the more a person has pro environmental attitudes, the greater his/her propensity to save electricity. Contrary to the assumption, no significant influence was found for financial incentives. Therefore, no confirmation of the fourth research hypothesis is obtained.
Qualitative Findings
Qualitative research findings are intended to support and strengthen quantitative results. The qualitative results of this study are based on two open questions incorporated in the questionnaire that was administered to 34 consumers who participated in the IEC pilot study, focusing on three main content categories:
1. The consumers' motive for joining a demand management arrangement scheme of the IEC; 2. The electricity consumption pattern of consumers following a demand management arrangement; 3. The consumers' experience in participating in a demand management arrangement and their general impression of this arrangement.
Consumers' motive to join a demand management arrangement with the electricity company
The consumers' responses to the question "What is the motive for your joining a load management arrangement with the Israel Electricity Company?" shows that several motives exist for the decision to join a load management arrangement, which can be arranged according to their relative importance (weight). As can be seen in Figure 1 , the participants' main motive was monetary benefit (41.2%). Nevertheless, it can be seen that, on the consumer side, the consumption was managed by personal measures taken by the customer, such as using high energy appliances during less loaded hours or changing to economic light bulbs, and on the supplier side, it was managed by the IEC controlling home electrical appliances remotely to reduce electricity consumption. All these measures reduced electricity consumption. Therefore, the two motives, consumption management (which eventually leads to electricity savings) and electricity savings, together have the highest weight (35.3%) in the decision to join this arrangement.
Figure 1: Weight of each motive in the decision to join the demand management arrangement
The economic motives, expressed in costs derived from the demand management arrangement (for example, the cost of buying a smart board), monetary savings, and the effect on the electricity bill (similar to Wimberly, 2010), directly influence consumers in the smart electric network, so that, in fact, decreasing the payments to consumers is a preliminary key requirement in the smart electric network (SGCC, 2011).Two additional motives are salient in the decision to join the demand management arrangement: environmental quality, which characterizes consumers who are concerned with the manner in which electricity consumption affects the environment through such things as carbon emissions from power stations, or consumers who are defined as "green" idealists and are enthusiastic energy savers, and therefore constitute a group that is compatible with the installation of smart meters and a personal electricity tariff (similar to Zhang et al., 2012) . A technological motive characterizes consumers who are fans of new technologies that improve performance or offer new services (as does the smart board). Despite the relatively low weight of these motives in the decision to join the demand management arrangement, it is certain that these consumers would be the first to adopt programs for managing demand in the framework of the smart electricity network (similar to SGCC, 2011).
The electricity consumption pattern of consumers in the framework of the demand management arrangement
The answers of consumers to the question "Will there be a change in the electricity consumption pattern in your home following the load management arrangement? If so, note several of your actions in this area" indicate a change will occur in the electricity consumption pattern of approximately 88% of consumers. The consumers who stated that there will be a change reported that they take measures to save electricity, such as operating electric appliances, for example, the washing machine and dryer, at night, installing a "Sabbath clock" for the electric boiler, replacing appliances that are not energy efficient, mostly the refrigerator and light bulbs, with economic ones, turning off electricity when leaving the house, setting the air conditioner's temperature at 25 degrees, and more.
In fact, there are consumers who have succeeded in adopting a behavior pattern of "decrease" that demands new habits, such as operating electric appliances during less loaded hours or regulating the air conditioner's temperature, in addition to behavior based on energy efficiency, such as replacing the refrigerator and light bulbs with more economic ones (similar to Gardner & Stern, 2002; Abrahamse et al., 2005 ).
General impression of the demand management arrangement
Open interviews, in which general questions not prepared in advance were asked, were conducted with consumers in order to obtain general information about the experience of participating in a demand management arrangement with the electricity company and their personal impression of this arrangement. In general, consumers expressed satisfaction with the arrangement because of the monetary benefit of a discount in the electricity bill and the possibility of managing their electricity consumption such that they benefit from electricity savings. Nevertheless, there were consumers who were afraid of allowing the electricity company to remotely control their appliances, on the grounds that the company could use this to forward its own interests.
One of the issues about the arrangement that was mentioned by consumers was comfort. Consumers reported a lack of comfort as a result of "load shedding" in various orders of importance. They expressed that a slight inconvenience was caused by the air conditioner's ceasing to work for several minutes, a medium inconvenience by the oven ceasing to work in the middle of baking a cake, and a great inconvenience by the stopping of a child's oxygen machine following "load shedding" (critical event, after which a switch enabling the consumer to turn of the "load shedding" was inserted in the smart board). An interesting point was the choice of the order in which electric appliances should be cut off during the "load shedding." Consumers chose electric appliances, such as the oven, drying machine and refrigerator, and in fact most of them did not give high priority to lighting, which is the first interface in which the consumer notices an electricity cutoff. Another point that interviewees mentioned during the interviews was their lack of knowledge about operating the smart board. The only information that the consumers had received was the one provided at the beginning of the pilot study by the representative of the firm that had developed the smart board. The representative explained in general the goals of the pilot study, and the possibility of using the smart board to obtain information about electric appliances in the house through connecting to an Internet portal. Many consumers felt that they lacked technical information about operating the smart board so that they could manage their electricity consumption and achieve electricity savings. If more information had been provided, the number of consumers whose electricity demand pattern changed as a result of the demand management arrangement could have increased.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Meaning of Findings
The first research hypothesis was that a monetary incentive in the framework of a demand management arrangement would influence the electricity demand pattern of the household consumer, decreasing it. Although the data showed a change in the electricity consumption of consumers who participated in the pilot study, it can be seen that during the pilot period the electricity consumption of the consumers actually increased. That is, the first research hypothesis was not confirmed. A possible explanation for this finding is that the monetary incentive the household consumers had received for participating in the pilot study was a fixed sum of 85 dollar and the manner in which it was received was a direct discount in their electricity bill. It may be that the users conceived the discount as a sort of possibility "to go wild" in their electricity consumption and chose to use more of the electricity resource to realize the economic saving. This result, which is opposite to that expected, raises the assumption that among consumers who participated in the pilot study a phenomenon called the "rebound effect" occurred, that is, a phenomenon caused by the unexpected consequences of a certain step (see, for example, Berkhout et al., 2000 & Mizobuchi, 2008 . Furthermore, a severance of a correspondence between the level of use of the consumer and the sum that in fact he/she has to pay for the same consumption leads to wasteful behavior (Marujelos & Young, 2011). Indeed, in this case a complete severance between the use and payment did not occur. This may mean that the constant sum and the fact that it was given directly as a discount in the electricity bill, and not, for example, in the form of cash or check, were the factors that eventually lead to a rise in use. As noted by Goldman et al., an experiment conducted in California, where there was a connection (although not linear) between a consumption decrease and an economic incentive, showed the incentives to be efficient (Goldman et al., 2002) . These findings are also compatible with those of other studies that showed that an incentive based on variable pricing is more efficient than a constant economic incentive for creating consumers' active involvement in managing demand (Maria & Julija, 2013) and has the ability to lead a change in consumers' consumption patterns (Fan & Hyndman, 2011) .
The second research hypothesis was that a demand management arrangement through the smart board and a monetary incentive would influence the propensity for reducing the consumers' demand for electricity. This hypothesis was, again, not confirmed. A possible explanation for this finding is that electricity consumers feel that the electricity is a product with a low involvement level (Watson et al., 2002) . In fact, electricity consumers perceive electricity as a basic product, the consumption of which cannot be significantly decreased (Tabori, 2012) , even when the electricity company installs a smart board and gives a monetary incentive to consumers that would decrease the demand for electricity during peak hours. This finding strengthens the concept that the demand for electricity among household consumers is rigid, that is, that a change in price will not significantly change the quantity of electricity demanded, and consumers feel that they cannot significantly influence the electricity bill and its price in any way.
The third research hypothesis -that various financial incentives influence consumers' willingness to join a demand management arrangement in the futurewas only partially confirmed. Only a monetary fine was found to influence consumer's willingness to join a demand management arrangement. The salient point is that the consumers' willingness to participate in a demand management arrangement is derived from the wish to avoid a monetary fine (as a result of not entering an arrangement or as a result of a deviation in their electricity consumption). These findings confirm those of previous studies, according to which using a negative incentive can lead to more economic consumption behavioral patterns (Dolev et al., 2012) . Furthermore, the examination of consumers' willingness to join a possible arrangement in the future in return for a monetary incentive of a discount in the electricity bill showed that if the arrangement involved invasion of privacy, Israeli consumers would be ready to accept this (assuming that they would receive the monetary incentive). This finding contradicts the results of other studies which reported that household consumers were concerned about invasion of privacy and safety, and that information about them would be shared with a third party as a result of their participation in household energy management programs (SGCC, 2011). Nevertheless, if the arrangement included losing control of electric appliances in the house or turning over the control to an external company, the willingness decreased drastically. These findings also confirm those of other studies which showed that customers' low willingness to participate in household energy management programs is derived from customers' cautiousness in all that concerns the electricity company's motives, and consumers do not always view the benefit of these programs in the same manner as the electricity companies do (SGCC, 2011). Nevertheless, consumers are willing to join programs of managing electricity if this would result in a decrease in their electricity bill (similar to Guthridge, 2010) . It may be that the great resistance to losing control of electricity appliances is derived from the fear of damaging the comfort that these appliances provide, as it seems that the possible damage to privacy almost did not influence the attitude of the potential participants, and only the possibility that they would not be able to completely control their comfort level was a factor that influenced their resistance to the programs. Previous studies (for example KEMA, 2010) showed that complaints in trials of load shedding programs commonly concerned damage to comfort, similar to the complaints that consumers who participated in the pilot study expressed, and therefore, it is clear that the issues of control and comfort are important. The importance of these issues is derived from the fact that in many instances the electricity appliances that supply maximum "comfort" are those related to temperature regulation and are therefore especially energy greedy appliances (one should not compare electricity consumed by an economy light bulb with that consumed by an air conditioner, for example). The fact that no differences were found between the different groups of participants examined in the pilot study is evidence of a "universality" of comfort preference, and it should be considered when planning a policy.
The fourth research hypothesis -that a constant monetary incentive of a discount in the electricity bill would be the dominant variable amongst the variables that influence the propensity to save electricity -was surprisingly not confirmed , and no relationships were found between the monetary incentives (negative or positive) and the propensity to save electricity consumption. This is in contrast to the results of many previous studies which suggested that a discount in electricity influenced the consumer to save electricity (see, for example, Mizobuchi & Takeuchi, 2012 and Goldman et al., 2002) as did a negative incentive, which is, fining consumers who deviated from the defined quantity of consumption. Studies found that frequently levying fines is an efficient strategy for influencing individuals' behavior, especially concerning consumption (for example, Lusardi et al., 2007) . No connection was found between the consumers' comfort and their propensity to save electricity. This is in contrast to the findings of the pilot study, where the participating consumers complained that cutting off electric appliances remotely damaged their comfort and that this had a negative influence on their propensity to save electricity. This research study's findings show that the only factor that had a significant dominant influence on consumers' propensity to save electricity was the environmental awareness of the consumers. Recent studies conducted in Israel show that the Israeli consumers' consciousness of environmental issues has grown in recent years (see, for example, Bendes-Jacob, Donitz, & Reznikowski, 2012). Nevertheless, one should treat this finding with caution as studies (for example, Sagi et al., 2008) have shown that the connection between consumers' pro-environmental stances and their actual behavior is a tenuous.
Contribution of the Research
Demand management is an important tool for decreasing electricity consumption in smart electricity networks and for decreasing the hours during which the demand for electricity is at the "peak" by shifting demand from peak to low load hours. Furthermore, demand management contributes to improving the energy safety and to building future electricity systems that produce low levels of carbonates and include electricity from renewable electricity sources, taking into consideration environmental and health aspects of the state of Israel. Without customer readiness and without their active participation, the program's contribution to demand management will be smaller than expected and maybe not even be real because of decreased economic feasibility.
Thus far, research in Israel has dealt with various aspects of the smart network that focus on its technical and technological aspects. This research is the first study conducted in Israel that addresses the issue of the smart network from the consumers' perspective. Its contribution is in its examination and analysis of the behavior response to financial incentives and the manner in which the consumers' experience of participating in the system for managing load from the demand side influences their willingness to take an active part in the smart network and decrease consumption. There is no doubt that, without the active participation of consumers, the efficiency of the smart network in general and of the system for managing demand in particular will be limited.
The insight provided by this research will help decision makers, both in the government and in the electricity company, to understand better various aspects of the interaction between consumers and various elements in the network, aspects that usually are not included in studies that focus only on technology or economic costs. The research findings will facilitate the planning of a better system that takes into consideration the needs and constraints of the electricity network on the one hand and the needs and expectations of the consumers on the other.
Results are important for the debate about energy conservation and energy efficiency from all over the world and not only from Israel. The various theories explaining electricity consumer behavior are culturally sensitive, experiences from various countries bring new, specific perspectives, so the results from the Israeli market, especially the unexpected ones, add an important piece to the electricity saving puzzle.
